

CANADIAN JOURNAL of URBAN RESEARCH

REVUE CANADIENNE de RECHERCHE URBAINE

Modal logics of aging purpose-built rental housing in Vancouver's suburbs

Craig Jones*

Department of Geography, University of British Columbia

Abstract

Most Vancouver's suburban stock of purpose-built rental housing is aging, and there is concern that much of it could soon face redevelopment pressure. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of this stock for providing marginalized renters with naturally occurring affordable housing options, and the displacement of renters for redevelopment has been observed in certain Metro Vancouver neighbourhoods. Further, there is a shortage of affordable rental housing options in suburban Vancouver, which may be exacerbated by the demolition of the older stock. In late-2016 to early-2017 I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with urban planners, politicians, real estate and housing professionals to collect a range of perspectives on the past, present and future of aging rental housing in Vancouver's suburbs. The key insights to emerge from this research are that the current rental stock is insufficient to meet demand, government policy may have contributed to a lack of supply, and expanding the supply of suburban rental housing will depend on maintaining a delicate balance between preservation and redevelopment.

Keywords: suburban purpose-built rental housing; redevelopment; urban planning

Résumé

La plupart des logements locatifs dans les banlieues de Vancouver vieillissent, et on craint qu'une grande partie d'entre eux ne subisse bientôt des pressions de réaménagement. Des recherches antérieures ont démontré l'importance de ces logements pour fournir aux locataires marginalisés des options de logement abordables naturelles. Or, le déplacement des locataires pour le réaménagement a été observé dans certains quartiers de la région métropolitaine de Vancouver. De plus, il y a une pénurie d'options de logements locatifs abordables dans la banlieue de Vancouver, qui peut être exacerbée par la démolition de logements locatifs plus anciens. À la fin de 2016 au début de 2017, 27 entretiens semi-structurés ont été menés avec des urbanistes, des politiciens, des professionnels de l'immobilier et du logement afin de recueillir un éventail de points de vue sur le passé, le présent et l'avenir des logements locatifs vieillissants dans la banlieue de Vancouver. Les conclusions qui ressortent de cette recherche sont que le logement locatif actuel est insuffisant pour répondre à la demande, la politique gouvernementale peut avoir contribué à un manque d'offre et l'expansion de l'offre de logements locatifs de banlieue dépendra du maintien d'un équilibre délicat entre la préservation et le réaménagement.

Mots-clés : locatifs de banlieue ; réaménagement ; aménagement urbain

Canadian Journal of Urban Research, Summer 2022, Volume 31, Issue 1, pages 111–124.

Copyright © 2022 by the Institute of Urban Studies.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

ISSN: 2371-0292

*Correspondence to: Craig Jones, 1866 Main Mall, Buchanan A240, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z1 Canada
Email: craig.e.jones@geog.ubc.ca

Introduction

A study commissioned by the Metro Vancouver regional district in 2012 estimated that approximately 4,500 aging purpose-built rental (PBR) units in six of Vancouver's suburban municipalities faced moderate- to high-risk of redevelopment (Coriolis 2012). Previous work (Teixeira 2014; Jones and Ley 2016; Jones 2020) has documented the importance of Metro Vancouver's suburban aging PBR as a source of affordable housing for low-income renters, including recent immigrants and refugees. The future of this stock is worthy of attention, because Metro Vancouver faces an affordable housing shortage and aging suburban PBR provides naturally occurring affordable housing (NOAH) options for marginalized suburban renters. Approximately 50% of PBR units in Metro Vancouver are suburban, and approximately 70% of the loss of PBR units from 2017-2021 took place outside of the City of Vancouver. Unlike other BC municipalities subject to the Local Government Act, the City of Vancouver has its own charter, which grants it additional power restrict demolitions permits. For these reasons, this study focuses on the modal logics of various stakeholders in relation to PBR in Vancouver's suburbs.

The majority of Metro Vancouver's stock of suburban PBR is at least 40 years old, of wood-frame construction, and sits on land that has become more central as Metropolitan Vancouver has expanded and densified. There are legitimate concerns that many suburban PBR buildings are approaching their "End of Life," a poorly defined term suggesting that either significant reinvestment in core building systems is needed, or that a building should be redeveloped. In certain locations, redevelopment appears inevitable. I conducted 27 key-informant interviews to hear how a variety of key actors in these processes thought these processes might unfold. The key themes that emerged form the empirical section of this paper.

This article addresses the following questions: How do different actors in Vancouver's suburban municipalities conceptualize the value of aging rental housing? How are the fundamental tensions between the use and exchange value of affordable rental housing balanced, contested, and resolved through the actions of the state, the market, and residents? The central concern that emerged from this study is that there is a lack of supply of PBR units in Vancouver's suburbs, while most of the existing stock is aging. In 1991, there were 118,749 PBR units in Metro Vancouver and this fell to a low point of 106,395 units in 2008. The stock began to rebound in 2009, rising to 115,949 units in 2020, for a net loss of 2,800 units. Considering that the population of Metro Vancouver increased from 1.5 million in 1991, to an estimated 2.7 million in 2020, the PBR stock has not kept up with population growth (Statistics Canada 1991; BC Stats 2021). Over the 1990-2020 period, the average PBR vacancy rate was 1.4%. The highest vacancy rate was 2.7% in 1998 and in 2008 the vacancy rate hit a low of 0.6%. Of the 115,949 PBR units in 2020, 74% were built before 1980 (CMHC 2022).

In the literature review I highlight the conceptual complexity of the North American suburb to argue that there is an inherent conflict in planning the future of suburban PBR. Suitable housing is the foundation for strong, healthy economies and communities. A host of changes in the 1970s undermined the economic viability of PBR development. Despite strong demand, the private market failed to produce sufficient PBR through the 1980s and 1990s. When the federal government stopped support for new social housing in the 1990s, a national affordable housing crisis ensued. The demand for affordable PBR now outstrips the existing stock. In recent years there has been an impressive growth in new PBR housing starts, but the older and more affordable stock faces potential erosion through redevelopment.

In late-2016 to early-2017, I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with property development and rental housing industry experts, local government politicians, urban planners, BC Housing Senior Staff and one Member of the BC Legislative Assembly. Interview questions focused on Vancouver's suburban municipalities of Burnaby, Coquitlam, Surrey, New Westminster and the City of North Vancouver. These municipalities were chosen due to a relatively higher concentration of pre-1980 PBR units compared to other suburbs. Research questions were organized around themes of how key informants viewed 1) the marginalization of aging suburban rental neighbourhoods, 2) the value of aging rental housing, and 3) the future of PBR supply.

The key findings of this study are that the current stock of PBR is insufficient to meet demand, government policy may have contributed to a lack of supply, and expanding the supply of PBR will depend on collaboration and a delicate balance of preservation and redevelopment.

Suburban complexity and change

Suburbanization has been the dominant urban process in most North American cities over the postwar period (Bourne and Hulchanski 2020). In spite of this, we know relatively little about the differences between how urban and suburban housing markets function (Hepburn et al. 2022). State efforts to increase access to mortgage credit and the image of the suburbs as an escape from a host of urban issues made suburban housing development tremendously popular (Moos et al. 2015). The decentralization of manufacturing and employment opportunities also contributed to suburban population growth (Harvey 1990, Walks 2001). Although the central city has typically been viewed as a more productive lens through which to view society (Hayden 2003), the demographic importance of the suburbs suggests that urban researchers should take the study of the suburbs more seriously (Keil et al. 2015).

Despite the stereotype of social homogeneity, suburban complexity and diversity was the norm before the creation of the corporate suburb following WW2 (Harris 2004). The geography of the Canadian suburb began to conform to a model more similar to that of the US during the 1950s because the federal government favoured large developers that produced similar landscapes across the country (Lorimer 1978; Harris 2004). Harris and Lewis (2001) have theorized the complexity of suburbs through a model of poly-nucleation, composed of diverse land uses and economic functions that reflect and reinforce complex social geographies. The three stages for the Canadian suburb during the 20th century were, first, low levels of state regulation and high social diversity, then, high levels of state regulation and increased homogeneity, and finally, more mixed developments and higher levels of social, economic and cultural diversity (Keil et al. 2015). Although individual Canadian suburban municipalities may be socially homogenous, in aggregate the suburbs have become more diverse (Harris 2004; Nijman and Clery 2015). Exemplary projects of suburban homogeneity such as Levittown, New Jersey, and Don Mills in Toronto, represent but one suburban form (Ekers et al. 2012).

Suburbanism is both distinct and yet inseparable from urbanism, and Lorimer (1978) recognized that the post-war development of the corporate suburb was part of the same process as developing high-density apartment living in the inner city. Harris (2013) proposed a zone, or stage model of development to explain processes of suburban change. Newly-developed suburban areas temporarily produce fixed landscapes of socio-economic homogeneity. Over time, urban expansion and depreciation of the built environment combine to attract reinvestment. Conformity is ascendant only for as long as socio-spatial contests are obscured by a short-lived period of stability and suburban governance structures that seek to resist further change (Harris 2013). Spatial patterns of residential investment and reinvestment shift according to several factors, including changing levels of profitability, public policy, zoning and the development of infrastructure, notably transportation (Bourne and Hulchanski 2020).

Urban theorists began to seriously wrestle with questions of complexity in the suburbs in the early 2000s as the prevailing view of conformity began to lose traction (Hayden 2003). Now there is far more interest in the suburbs and far less agreement about their characteristics. Nijman and Clery (2015) propose a chronology of the suburbs that incorporates the changing nature and fortunes of the American suburb as a response to restructuring of the metropolitan region. The suburbs were first a means of escape from the industrial city, then a response to innovations in transportation that allowed for the decentralization of the urban population, but also of services, industries and retail activities. After WW2, the entrance of the state and corporate development interests led to the rise of the suburb as monolith, but this period only lasted for 30 years (Nijman and Clery 2015). In the 1980s there was a real decline in the living standards of many suburbs, but populations continued to grow. The current reality of the American suburb is one of tremendous diversity between suburbs, with limited diversity within. As a result, segregation and exclusion within the suburbs is still present, expressed in the built environment through gated communities, and through fragmented suburban governance that uses its power and draws from market logic to enhance exclusion in ways that are not quite as visible as in the inner city. We might expect that these changes would lead to increased residential instability and displacement, but it is only relatively recently that studies have explored this in the suburbs (Clark 2005, Markley 2018, Jones 2020, Hepburn et al 2022).

In comparison to the American suburb, diversity in the Canadian suburb has largely been driven by immigration. In Toronto and Vancouver, former inner-suburban municipalities “filtered down” to become suburban immigrant reception areas, leading to concentrations of low-income suburban neighbourhoods where, “recent immigrants, are key participants in the suburbanization of poverty” (Ley and Lynch 2020, 130; Walks 2020). Hulchanski (2010) observed that from 1970 to 2005 low-income households became concentrated in Toronto’s inner suburbs, where access to transit and services is relatively poor. Immigrants and visible minorities were overrepresented in these areas.

Suburban affordable rental housing shortage

Suitable housing is the foundation for strong, healthy economies and communities, because it interacts with multiple modes of social reproduction, and access to affordable, good quality housing has a direct influence on the health and well-being of Canadians (Pomeroy 2004a). However, an ideology that associates property ownership with citizenship may have contributed to a bias against rental housing (Kemeny 1986). In the mid-1960s, Canada produced more social housing per capita than the United States, but a great deal less than Australia or Western European countries (Suttor 2016). The 1960s also saw a rental housing construction boom, with more than 100,000 private rental apartments built per year, far exceeding per-capita production in the US, Britain, Australia or France (Suttor 2016). The housing landscapes produced under this regime featured diversity in built form, tenure, and cost. However, Pomeroy and Maclennan (2019) argue that there is now an emerging rental housing crisis in most metropolitan areas of Canada due to a lack of available low-cost suburban rental housing. A combination of demographic, legislative, and economic changes in the 1970s undermined the viability of rental development as an investment vehicle (Pomeroy and Maclennan 2019). Private sector construction of rental housing declined through the 1980s and 1990s as higher profits could be generated from condominiums (Walks and Clifford 2015). There was still strong demand for rental housing, but the market primarily served homebuyers and investors (Pomeroy and Maclennan 2019).

As the private market was failing to produce PBR in the 1990s, federal support for new social housing came to an end through changes to the Canadian welfare state (Hulchanski 2004, Pomeroy 2004b). The transition from the Canadian Assistance Plan (CAP) to the Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST) represented the most significant change to Canadian welfare in more than a generation, and housing was not part of the mandate for the Social Security Review process of 1994 (Prince 1998; Suttor 2016). The CHST granted the provinces more flexibility on social spending, but the removal of cost-sharing arrangements for social housing reduced both the capacity and incentive for provinces to invest in social housing (Suttor 2016). The CHST put social spending on housing in competition with health care and post-secondary education. The federal government announced in 1996 that it would devolve responsibility for the administration of federally funded social housing programs and projects, effectively removing the federal government from social housing in Canada (Prince 1998). A national affordable housing crisis ensued, leading the Big City Mayor's Caucus and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities to declare a national housing disaster in 1998 (Shapcott 2004, Pomeroy 2004b). With the federal government effectively out of new social housing, provinces and municipalities had to shoulder the indirect costs of inadequate housing and homelessness (Hulchanski 2004; Leone and Carroll 2010).

At the same time, rising income inequality contributed to the polarization of the housing system (Pomeroy 1995; Tilly 2006). The profile of renters shifted as higher-income households moved into ownership, and the rental sector became increasingly composed of those with lower incomes (Pomeroy 2004b). The availability of low-cost rental housing was further diminished through conversions, demolitions and rent increases (Pomeroy 1995; Shapcott 2004). Despite the increasing cost of rental, the return on investment on new rental housing construction remained uncompetitive (Pomeroy 2004b). The supply of rental housing has now fallen far short of demand, and as many Canadians have been priced out of homeownership, pressure is expected to shift to a rental housing stock ill-equipped to handle increased demand (Pomeroy 2015). As of 2012, 55% of suburban Vancouver's PBR units were built before 1970, and an estimated 16% of the stock was at risk of redevelopment (Coriolis 2012).

In recent years there has been a surge in suburban PBR construction. From 2014–2020, PBR housing starts in Vancouver's suburbs totalled 21,669 units. In comparison, there were only 12,258 PBR housing starts in the twenty-four years from 1990–2013 (CMHC 2022). Despite these encouraging signs of a return of investor interest in PBR construction, rents in new PBR units are high. According to CMHC's 2021 Rental Market Survey, average rents for 1- and 2-bedroom PBR units built after 2000 in the Vancouver CMA are 31% higher than overall average rents.

Additional concerns have been raised regarding institutional investors acquiring existing PBR in Canada (August and Walks 2018). The first six months of 2021 broke sales records for both the number and value of PBR transactions in BC, and institutional purchasers such as Real Estate Investment Trusts accounted for 15% of purchasers (Avison Young 2021). For many years, Pomeroy (2001; 2012) has been arguing for the preservation of the existing rental housing stock through acquisition by non-profit housing operators. For every social housing unit built in Canada from 2011–2016, 15 units renting for less than \$750 were lost (Pomeroy 2020). Optimism for the impressive growth of new PBR construction in recent years is tempered by the ongoing net erosion of the affordable rental stock.

This study addresses gaps in our understanding of suburban rental housing markets, by exploring the modal logics of various key stakeholders in positions to influence the stock of PBR in suburban Vancouver. This paper offers

insights and data on Vancouver's suburban rental housing shortage due to the aging of the existing stock amid 25 years without new PBR development. I consider key informants' arguments that private sector actions and public policies have restricted new supply. There was general agreement that in order to address the shortage of affordable suburban rental housing in Vancouver, the overall supply of suburban PBR must be expanded. The majority of public officials agreed that the stock of aging PBR should be preserved while expanding the stock, to avoid the displacement of marginalized suburban renters, but this was not supported by private-industry informants.

Methods and data collection

In the following sections, I consider the transitional status of PBR housing in Vancouver's suburbs, as buildings deteriorate and the land on which they sit becomes more central and of higher value (Harris 2013). In late-2016 to early-2017, I conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-seven key informants, with varied perspectives on suburban rental housing. I interviewed property development and rental real estate professionals (n=7), urban planning professionals and officials (n=9), local government politicians (n=7), BC Housing senior staff (n=2), and one Member of the Legislative Assembly for BC. All interviews were tape-recorded and typically lasted 90-minutes. Participants were initially approached based on their professional involvement in rental housing development, management and policy in the suburban municipalities of interest. My familiarity with the research topic informed the list of initial email contacts, and a snowball sampling approach expanded on the initial list. I chose to focus on three types of key informant: 1) Local government elected officials on City Councils, 2) senior urban planners working for local governments, and 3) real estate and rental housing professionals. One rental housing developer operated only in the City of Vancouver, but I deemed his unique insights worth including in this study. Research questions were organized around key themes of 1) the marginalization of aging suburban rental neighbourhoods, 2) how informants attribute value to affordable rental housing, and 3) the future of affordable rental housing.

In no way do I assert that this is a representative, or exhaustive study of all possible actors involved in the processes that will affect the stock of rental housing in these suburban municipalities. Some local governments in this study were very open to participation, whereas planners from one local government were prevented from participating by City leadership. Although I was pleasantly surprised that so many private sector actors agree to participate, some key developers declined. By contacting a diverse group of key informants, the representation of any single group's perspective is thinner than it would be had I focused on the perspectives of a single sub-group.

A review of interview transcripts identified three key themes: 1) the aging of suburban rental housing and an overall lack of supply, 2) political issues that restrict the supply of PBR and the importance of industry-government communication, and 3) the tension between expanding the overall supply of PBR, while preserving the stock of aging PBR. Private-sector agents generally saw little reason to preserve the aging stock, arguing that these sites presented the greatest opportunities for densification and increasing the supply of PBR. Public officials were slightly more mixed in their perspectives. Although most city planners and elected officials agreed that redevelopment of ageing PBR had to be managed carefully, a small number argued that redevelopment and tenant displacement was inevitable and should be facilitated.

Secondary to the aging of suburban rental housing and an overall lack of supply was how challenging it can be for developers to generate a profit from PBR development, because of the time and complexity involved the rezoning process. Deferred maintenance was identified as a strategy of some landlords to justify renovictions or demolition, and also a response to a rent gap between the increasing value of land and decreasing value of buildings. As a result, many buildings are approaching their "End of Life".

Following the political issues that restrict the supply of PBR and the importance of industry-government communication, it was argued that government policies that sought to protect the existing PBR stock may have contributed to disincentives to build new PBR. Adding to these issues is the political divide between renters and homeowners, and efforts to attract their votes. In PBR redevelopment processes, the displacement of vulnerable renters was a key concern, and managing these concerns, among others, requires official and tacit communication between government and industry.

Attendant to the tension between expanding the overall supply of PBR, while preserving the stock of aging PBR, was an argument to see PBR as a public asset preferred over condominiums. A common view was that government and industry have to work together to expand the PBR supply. Private developers are profit-seeking, and

local governments can provide incentives and restrictions to harness the potential of private capital to produce PBR housing.

The aging of suburban rental housing and an overall lack of supply

Probably the greatest challenge is the preservation or renewal of the aging PBR stock and what to do when a building had reached its “End of Life”. This was often used to describe older buildings that had not been well-maintained, but there was no consensus among informants as to when a PBR building reaches its End of Life. As noted previously, with 74% of units being at least 40 years old, many units may require significant reinvestment.

Despite a lack of consensus on the meaning of End of Life, there was general agreement that it would not be feasible to renovate older, low-rise, wood-frame PBR buildings to current standards without raising rents. At 50 years of age, key building systems are likely to fail, and End of Life reflects the balance between extensive maintenance and a landlord’s opportunity to sell. If a landlord can sell their property for far more than it could generate in rents, this is a disincentive to invest in the building, harkening a premature End of Life for the building. But this is not a simple process. Landlord/Developer 3 had successfully purchased and renovated several older, wood-frame PBR buildings in the City of Vancouver. Despite his success, he argued that this business model was fraught with difficult negotiations with the City, and the modest return would not be large enough for most investors.

Given the fact that the City is so difficult to deal with, and... it’s so intensive, and having to evict tenants, all those factors. [Most investors] say, “Well, we can deploy our funds in other areas.” (Landlord/Developer 3)

Several informants noted that some buildings were in poor condition due to a lack of maintenance. Allowing a building to deteriorate can be a strategy to compel a City Council to approve a rezoning. An elected official noted that the City of Surrey had introduced policies to communicate to the development community that this would not be a viable strategy. “What we’re trying to do... is find ways to make sure that developers understand that letting... the stock decline is not going to be a way for them to get their project’s redevelopment happening” (Surrey Elected Official). The BC MLA argued that the effectiveness of policies comes down to enforcement. “So you don’t just need the rule. You also actually need enforcement and warnings and then actually you might have to... make an example of [a landlord] so that all the other building owners see that, ‘hey, the City means business on this’” (BC MLA).

In some cases, deferred maintenance on buildings had diminished living conditions to unhealthy and unsafe levels. At the extreme, fires in older PBR buildings that lacked up-to-date fire prevention and monitoring systems had led to a loss of life. North Shore Planner 1 noted that, “we’ve got ones... [built] in the ‘60s that have tons of deferred maintenance. No one’s ever done anything over the years. They’re death traps.” Interestingly, the harshest criticism of landlords that allow their buildings to deteriorate come from an industry insider. “The owners were, basically, raping the building, taking the profits, not putting money into the buildings...” (Landlord/Developer 3).

In these cases of deferred maintenance and threats to tenant safety, municipalities have to find a balance between ensuring safety, and not requiring upgrades so onerous and expensive that it could push a landlord into selling. Although it was noted that many buildings could be upgraded with moderate investment, the Senior North Shore Planner argued, “You don’t want to lead to the unintentional demolition of buildings because they can’t afford to put in a very expensive sprinkling system.”

Coriolis Consulting (2012) found that the greatest predictor of redevelopment of a PBR building was the gap between the current density on the site, and the achievable density through redevelopment. Under the Local Government Act, municipal governments in BC do not have the right to refuse demolition permits, except for certain heritage reasons. Any property owner has the right to demolish a building and redevelop at existing zoning. Demolishing a 3-storey PBR building to build a 3-storey condominium building does not usually make economic sense, but on Vancouver’s North Shore, requests for PBR demolition permits in order to build condos at current zoning were becoming not uncommon. “I think at this point that’s less of a bluff than it ever has been in the past, because I think the market has actually changed to the point where that will happen” (North Shore Planner 1).

The acquisition of older PBR buildings on large sites was a long-term investment strategy for Landlord/Developers 1 & 2. They had acquired several low-rise, wood-frame, walk-up PBR buildings for their future redevelopment potential as high-rise towers. “So all those wood frames you see... sitting on a 150-foot site with surface parking at

the back, whether the zoning's there or not, right now, the shrewd investor knows that eventually, the zoning will come, and those bigger sites like that will be worth a fortune" (Landlord/Developer 1). This long-term strategy of acquisition in order to eventually apply for a rezoning speaks to how policies may have contributed to virtually no new PBR development in Metro Vancouver from 1990–2014.

Political issues that restrict the supply of PBR and the importance of industry-government communication

Informants from all sectors argued that provincial and local government policies have contributed to the restricted supply of PBR, albeit for different reasons. Industry informants argued that provincial and local government policies that sought to protect and preserve existing PBR had kept some rents artificially low, reduced the supply of new buildings and prevented the high-density redevelopment of low-density PBR sites. Landlord/Developers 1 & 2 argued that BC's rental industry is dysfunctional because of provincial government interventions such as rent control and restrictions on evictions. They argued that the BC government lacked expertise and consistently failed to consult industry when making legislative changes.

Expanding the supply of PBR presents risks for local government politicians who agree that supply should be increased through up-zoning. Homeowners tend to oppose densification near to their homes and they tend to be more active in local politics (Fischel 2005). "People that live in a single-family home get out and drive [the] vote" (Condo Developer). On the other hand, stories of tenant displacement for redevelopment can be both politically and personally difficult. "What's really difficult politically for our Council is getting the calls from... the 75-year-old woman that's lived there for 30 years, saying, 'They've told me they're going to tear down my building, you know? It's a horrible call to get'" (Senior North Shore Planner).

One elected official noted that supporting up-zoning on PBR sites to encourage new rental redevelopment had brought about the end of their political career. "I will change... by helping encourage... dedicated rental. That takes political courage. That takes leadership, and that also means you've set the clock on the end of your tenure. You are going to be defeated" (CNV Elected Official). This sentiment was echoed by the Senior North Shore Planner who commented that approving high density rental projects costs City Council members, "a lot of political capital to get approvals," but they don't get "kudos" from the community because the benefit to residents are not immediate.

A related issue is communication between government and the development industry. Metro Vancouver includes 21 municipalities, and industry informants argued that it was a challenge to anticipate which rezoning proposals a given municipality would support. Several informants spoke to the importance of communication between local governments and the development community. Through policy documents, tacit interactions, and media statements, local governments communicate their priorities to the development community, and developers pay attention. Local politicians' statements to media and industry groups inform the land acquisition strategies of developers, especially if redevelopment requires tenant displacement. When a municipality is clear it will not support rezoning PBR sites to higher densities, developers adjust their strategies. Jones (2022) explored the influence that a powerful mayor can exert over land use and development policies. Changes in City Council, land use policy, and media communications inform developers' strategies.

We're typically looking for opportunities all the time to tear down... we don't undertake any projects unless they're \$50 million-plus... If we can possibly assemble a number of apartment buildings adjacent to each other, like Metrotown where we take down two or three at a time, we are interested in that. We've been actively doing that... Burnaby, under (former Mayor) Corrigan... permit[ted] the demolition of rentals... Corrigan has stated publicly to the public, the industry, whatever, that it is not a municipal issue to deal with existing tenants... So that is the green light for us to proceed... They are not going to stop us from terminating tenancies... The City of North Vancouver, City of Vancouver, clearly, they have a bylaw... we cannot do it. We don't try. So why bother? It's a bylaw. (Condo Developer)

In contrast to Burnaby's former laissez-faire approach to PBR preservation, New Westminster has actively sought to preserve PBR units. The importance of New Westminster's Secured Market Rental Housing policy was articulated by the municipality's elected official.

There's still nothing the City of New West can do if someone wants to tear down their rental building. But essentially, what the policy has put in place is whatever you're zoning in terms of your building entitlements, that's all you can do. So it's taken... a big carrot away from someone going in here going, "Well, this is a high density near a SkyTrain. This would be a good location for a high-rise... But oh, wait a second. If... we're dealing with an existing rental building, I'm stuck with this zoning from the 1960s that says three-storey..." (New Westminster Elected Official)

New Westminster's position on retaining the stock of older PBR did not reduce new development applications submitted to the City, and it brought attention from developers who did not previously look to build in the city. New Westminster followed through on strict regulations and incentives, which helped create an environment of certainty for developers that chose to operate there.

It has actually brought in new developers, particularly those that actually build rental housing... And... the fact that there was a lot of incentives... brought in a segment of the development community that was actually, "Okay, we have a home here, and we can see how our projects can economically work." (New Westminster Elected Official)

The majority of industry informants spoke to the importance of maintaining personal relationships with local government. Personal experience of the permitting and rezoning process can allow developers to "push back" for exemptions to certain policies. Experience with previous rezonings and good relationships with City staff can make developers more comfortable with proposing ambitious projects. Meetings between developers and local politicians can establish a shared understanding of the community engagement developers should undertake in order to be confident of receiving support from mayors and councillors. Through the rezoning process, informal, tacit interactions between cities, developers and the community are more fluid and important than a policy-focused analysis might suggest (Hyde 2018).

An extreme breakdown in communication between a City and a developer could result in a developer attempting to sue the City. However, it was argued that is unlikely to happen as it would terminate a developer's ability to function in that municipality.

None of the developers are going to sue... you'll never do another development in that community again... you will never see a developer stand up in public... and ever criticize... any municipality, unless you decided you never want to do another deal in that municipality... And it's just politics. I mean you want to play the game, you shut up... The Planning Department will just run you through the mill. (Condo Developer)

The City of North Vancouver Elected Official noted that although local governments cannot withhold demolition permits under the Local Government Act, a heritage designation can be applied to almost any structure. This may not actually occur, but it speaks to the ways that local governments can exert leverage that is not explicit in the Local Government Act. "You can call anything heritage... so if the municipality wants to keep it, we have the tools to do that" (CNV Elected Official).

Expanding the overall supply of PBR, while preserving the stock of aging PBR

Four industry informants and one planner argued that for too long the development of condominiums has been viewed as equivalent to building new PBR. It was argued there is a great deal of pent-up demand for high-quality PBR in Metro Vancouver, and for decades that demand has been mitigated by condominium rentals. However, several informants rejected the argument that investors adding condos to the rental supply is equivalent to PBR, because condos offer less security of tenure because tenants can be evicted to allow the owner, or their family members to move in. With time, PBR rents tend to become more affordable, but this is not the case with condos. Large-scale evictions of tenants from a PBR building tend to attract media attention and tenants can organize a challenge to eviction orders through BC's Residential Tenancy Branch, giving them an additional layer of security.

Notable by its absence, industry informants did not comment that preserving the aging PBR stock was important. In contrast, many planners and government officials argued that the aging PBR stock has come to assume a disproportionately important role in the region's affordable housing stock. Many local government informants argued that most aging PBR buildings could not both see significant reinvestment and be preserved at existing levels of affordability. However, when asked if New Westminster's preservation policy was merely a stopgap and that much of this stock would eventually reach End of Life, the New Westminster Elected Official argued that municipalities should work to retain this stock.

I can argue that that stopgap's important, though, because if that stopgap adds another 20, 25 years [to] units [for] people that... would not have otherwise been able to find housing in that particular... location, that's not a stopgap. That's actually of value to the housing network. (New Westminster Elected Official)

Several public officials argued that slowing the loss of NOAH must be prioritized to address the lack of affordable housing. However, the development of new PBR must be balanced against the loss of the PBR stock. A shortage of available, affordable rental housing in the suburbs means that a net gain in the PBR stock could be bad for tenants in buildings demolished for new construction.

When you find yourself in a hole, you need to stop digging, right? So, if our goal is to arrest the growth of homelessness and reverse it and arrest the loss of workforce housing and increase workforce housing, then... the first thing is we need to stop the loss of housing that is key to these different populations... you have to stop the loss of affordable housing first and then your 5,000 [new] units could actually make a difference for the people who are on the streets right now... (BC MLA)

You are creating more units, but you're basically forcing those people to leave... we can't allow those buildings to be torn down because there's... no safety net for those people. Like, we don't want a homeless crisis on our hands. (New Westminster Staffer)

The New Westminster Staffer further argued that in addition to being inadvisable, it was unnecessary to demolish older PBR to expand the supply of housing.

There's lots of choice. And... we're getting lots of housing. We don't need to touch our rental stock in New West to meet our housing [targets]... you can add tons of units without touching [the rental stock], so I'm not buying that argument that you need those sites to build density for now. Maybe 30 years down the line you might need it... (New Westminster Staffer)

There was general agreement from all informants that additional density is needed in order to build a new PBR project. When compared with condominium development, PBR requires additional density to be financially feasible. Metro Vancouver's suburban municipalities have realized that a range of incentives can be used to encourage PBR, and several informants agreed that suburban municipalities were starting to grant additional density. North Shore Planner 2 was concerned that municipal policies designed to encourage new PBR might contribute to the loss of the aging PBR stock. "Sometimes, I worry that, as planners, are we creating that pressure? But also recognizing that... we're really in this problem because we had no new rental built between 1980s to 2000" (North Shore Planner 2). Despite the fact that rents for newer PBR units are higher, municipal incentives are justified because PBR becomes more affordable over time. "We're not going to have a net loss of rental. I think we're going to have a net gain. And we're probably one of a very few number of municipalities that can actually say that" (North Shore Planner 1).

Industry informants argued that very large, for-profit developers that typically build condos would have to be convinced to build PBR. Because these developers control a huge share of the land base and the development market, their participation would be needed to see a significant increase in the supply of PBR. "The condo kings, as I call them, have started to see the light, and they're saying, 'Oh, yeah. You know, this is probably a good idea'" (Rental Industry 1).

The municipalities haven't even clued into the fact that they could create that by giving bonus density if you would build rental... [and] putting a covenant on the title... If they did something like that, then we would all start looking at that, no question. We would all start. I would be happy to walk into these neighbourhoods and tear down five buildings in a row and build one rental building and do that because I know I'm getting double the density. (Condo Developer)

Three local politicians, one BC Housing Senior Staff, and two planners argued that when PBR units are demolished, municipalities should prioritize their replacement. When a rezoning is required for redevelopment, there is an opportunity for the municipality to negotiate and incentivize a developer to build an equivalent, or greater number of PBR units. "Even if it feels a bit uncomfortable that we're having these demolitions, we are succeeding... In some cases we're doubling or tripling the number of... purpose-built rental units that are secured in perpetuity. That's a huge success" (Senior North Shore Planner).

In many interviews there was a sub-text of the need for collaboration between parties to expand the stock of PBR. "It's time for all stakeholders, all levels of government and developers, our industry to... collectively get together and say, 'Okay, we need to work this out together. We need to figure a way to do it'" (Rental Industry 1). Informants saw encouraging signs of a willingness to collaborate between government and developers. BC Housing Senior Staff 1 praised 90% of the municipalities with which they partnered. The Senior North Shore Planner gave a strong justification for municipalities to partner with developers to leverage resources to build PBR units.

It's probably challenging for any [planning] professional to argue that money should be set aside for affordable housing... this is the first moment in maybe 20 years when the feds and province are finally saying they have some money on the table... We just have to do something, whether it's our area of responsibility or not, and that's the tack that we've taken for many, many years. But there's a countervailing argument at most City Halls from finance department[s], from administration, "we can't afford to do it all," and this is one of the most expensive things that we could undertake, and it's not ours to do. We just can't do it... and it speaks to the need then, more than ever, to have a different perspective on how you make affordable housing projects happen. It's not by putting money in, maybe not even by putting land in. It's about harnessing the private development industry with the right kinds of incentive, carrots and sticks, to make them do the right thing, to create the affordability in the market... (Senior North Shore Planner).

Suburban Vancouver PBR in context

Paradis et al. (2014) document the linked crises of homelessness and a lack of affordable suburban PBR in Toronto. In their survey of over 1,500 households, they found that almost half their respondents lived in buildings in poor condition. In contrast to recent studies in Vancouver's suburbs, their study made no mention of demolitions. This may be due to their study being focused on high-rise towers. Much of Metro Vancouver's suburban stock is of wood-frame construction, which is much cheaper to demolish than concrete towers.

Goma (2020), and Mensah and Tucker-Simmons (2021) write of the demolition of approximately 150 units in in the multi-cultural Heron Gate community of Ottawa. Although Heron Gate is near the centre of Ottawa, this case strikingly parallels the cases of suburban Vancouver rental housing demolitions observed by Jones and Ley (2016) and Jones (2020). In all cases the demolitions were concentrated in diverse neighbourhoods, and the age and poor condition of the buildings were cited to justify the displacement of renters, and the limited compensation they received.

In the five years since the interviews for this study were completed, there have been some fairly significant changes in Canada's PBR stock. As of 2021, there are 2.2 million PBR units in Canada, the most that has been recorded. Regarding the older stock, suburban Vancouver is very different from the suburbs of Toronto and Montreal. Figure 1 shows data adapted from CMHC's Rental Market Survey. From 2017 to 2021 the stock of PBR built before the year 2000 declined in the Vancouver Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) by 4,265 units, or 4.2%. Approximately 70% of this decline took place outside the City of Vancouver. In contrast, the older stock was relatively untouched in the Toronto CMA, and although the Montreal CMA saw a decline of 1,648 units, this represents a decline of 0.3%




Figure 1
Change in the number of PBR units built before the year 2000 in the CMAs of Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal, 2017-2021. Adapted from CMHC Rental Market Survey (2021)

due to Montreal's vastly larger stock of PBR.

Conclusion

As Metro Vancouver's suburbs have matured, the supply of pre-1980 suburban PBRs has become geographically more central in the region (Harris 2013). A majority (74%) of suburban PBR units are at least 40 years old and there is immense pressure on this stock to provide NOAH options for marginalized suburban renters, including immigrants and refugees. Until recently, the supply of new PBR has been almost zero due to a poor rate of return, competition from condo development, and political interventions. Although there is renewed interest and support for building PBR, industry informants argued that it is still economically, technically and politically difficult to build new PBR projects in Vancouver's suburbs.

As PBRs approach End of Life, renewal or redevelopment of these buildings may be needed, and investments may require higher rents. When a landlord's profit from sale for redevelopment far outstrips what can be generated through rents, it is challenging to justify a building's retention. Overbearing, albeit well-meaning, regulations might also prematurely push a landlord into selling. Land-use re-designations and up-zoning can create redevelopment pressure on good-condition PBR buildings that could be viable for decades. Local governments must balance the expansion and renewal of PBR units, against the preservation of NOAH to avoid large-scale tenant displacement. Inaction is not an option. The status quo could possibly lead to an undesirable outcome where PBR buildings are redeveloped for condos without a rezoning, leading to a net loss of PBR.

Without the assurance of a 15% return, many for-profit developers will not build PBR. Local governments can provide incentives to for-profit developers to deliver PBR units instead of more condos. Granting additional density through rezoning is a key incentive. When a PBR development is being considered for a rezoning, it should be kept in mind that condo projects are financially viable at lower densities, but condominiums do not add to the stock of secured rental housing, and certainly not to the stock of affordable units. Because the supply of PBR units in suburban Vancouver has fallen short of demand, we currently find ourselves in a quandary. The PBR stock plays a disproportionate role in providing NOAH options for marginalized suburban renters, including immigrants and refugees. However, many of these buildings may be reaching End of Life and steps should be taken to prepare for their renewal, or demolition. Future research should explore how local governments can properly manage tenant relocation.

In seeking to protect renters from displacement, provincial and local governments may have inadvertently contributed to a lack of new PBR supply. Much of the older PBR stock standing today was financed using federal tax incentives and subsidies that have long been removed. The political divide between owners and renters can manifest in local government policy, which can influence the political fortunes of local government officials (Jones 2022). Local governments can communicate their rezoning priorities to developers through policies, but also through tacit

communication and statements to the media. Developers will adjust their strategies according to these priorities.

The main limitations of this study are due to the relatively small sample size of key informants, and the large and complex regulatory landscape of suburban PBR. The insights reported were common to the sample, but inherently partial. The key themes identified were gathered from informants at a particular place and time. In the years since, many informants are now in different professional roles and their perspectives may have changed. Some of the elected officials interviewed are no longer in politics, and their perspectives may no longer be relevant to local government policies. Large policy shifts are possible with small changes to membership on City Councils (Jones 2022). Despite these limitations, CMHC data on the PBR stock in the CMAs of Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal indicate that the motivation of this study to focus on Vancouver's suburban PBR stock was well-founded. Future research could seek to explain the why from 2017–2021, Vancouver's suburban stock of aging PBR declined to a degree so different from Canada's two other largest urban regions.

Although there was disagreement between informants as to the best way to manage tenant displacement, the importance of communication and collaboration emerged as a common theme. Tenant relocation for PBR redevelopment will continue to be a matter of concern in the city and suburbs of Vancouver. Developers should be encouraged to consult with tenants before taking a PBR rezoning project forward. Future research should review best practices and outcomes to help local governments design policies that accept the gradual transition of the PBR stock, while mitigating the harmful effects of displacement. This line of research is particularly important given the approval of the City of Vancouver's Broadway Plan on 22 June 2022 (Vancouver 2022), which applies to an area containing a significant amount of the city's aging PBR housing.

Acknowledgments and grants

The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) funding for the Neighbourhood Change Research Partnership and financial support from the Real Estate Foundation of BC through the University of British Columbia's Housing Research Collaborative. Thanks to David Ley for constructive comments on previous drafts. I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers whose thoughtful comments helped to improve this paper. Finally, I would like to recognize the financial support of the University of British Columbia and SSHRC's Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship Program, which provided doctoral awards for the period of this research.

References

- August, M., and A. Walks. 2018. Gentrification, suburban decline, and the financialization of multi-family rental housing: The case of Toronto. *Geoforum* 89: 124–136.
- Avison Y. 2021. British Columbia Investment Report. Fall 2021. https://www.avisonyoung.ca/documents/95750/91466007/BCMultiFamilyReport_Fall2021.
- BC Stats. 2021. British Columbia – Population Estimates and Projections. <https://bcstats.shinyapps.io/popApp/>.
- Bourne, L., and D. Hulchanski. 2020. Inequality and neighbourhood change: Context, concept, and process. In *Changing neighbourhoods: Social and spatial polarization in Canadian cities*, eds. J. Grant, A. Walks, and H. Ramos. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 5–30.
- Clark, E. 2005. The order and simplicity of gentrification—a political challenge.” In *Gentrification in a global context: The new urban colonialism*. New York, NY: Routledge, 261–269.
- CMHC (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation). 2022. Housing market information portal. <https://www03.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/hmip-pimh/en#Profile/1/1/Canada>.
- Coriolis Consulting Corporation. 2012. Metro Vancouver purpose-built rental housing: Inventory and risk analysis. <http://www.metrovancouver.org/services/regional-planning/PlanningPublications/MetroVancouverRentalInventoryandRiskAnalysis8May2012.pdf>.
- Ekers, M., P. Hamel, and R. Keil. 2012. Governing suburbia: Modalities and mechanisms of suburban governance. *Regional Studies* 46(3): 405–422.
- Fischel, W. A. 2005. *The homevoter hypothesis: How home values influence local government taxation, school finance, and land-use policies*. Harvard University Press.
- Gomá, M., 2020. Challenging the narrative of Canadian multicultural benevolence: A feminist anti-racist critique.

- OMNES: *The Journal of Multicultural Society* 10(1): 81–113.
- Harris, R. 2004. *Creeping conformity: How Canada became suburban, 1900–1960*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
- . 2013. How land markets make and change suburbs. In *Suburban constellations: Governance, land and infrastructure in the 21st century*, ed. R. Keil. Jovis verlag.
- Harris, R. and R. Lewis. 2001. The geography of North American cities and suburbs, 1900–1950: A new synthesis. *Journal of Urban History* 27(3): 262–292.
- Harvey, D. 1990. Flexible accumulation through urbanization reflections on “Post- Modernism” in the American city. *Perspecta* 26: 251–272.
- Hayden, D. 2003. *Building suburbia: Green fields and urban growth, 1820–2000*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.
- Hepburn, P., D. Q. Rutan, and M. Desmond. 2022. Beyond urban displacement: Suburban poverty and eviction. *Urban Affairs Review*, p.10780874221085676.
- Hou, F. 2004. Recent immigration and the formation of visible minority neighbourhoods in Canada's large cities (Ottawa: Statistics Canada Analytical Studies Research Paper Series) Cat. 11F0019MIE – 221. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2004221-eng.pdf?st=O9oXdJrz>.
- Hulchanski, D. 2004. How did we get here? The evolution of Canada's ‘exclusionary’ housing system. In *Finding room: Policy options for a Canadian rental housing strategy*, ed. D. Hulchanski, and M. Shapcott. Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto.
- . 2010. The three cities within Toronto: Income polarization among Toronto's neighbourhoods, 1970–2005. Toronto, ON: Cities Centre Press, University of Toronto. <http://www.urbancentre.utoronto.ca/pdfs/curp/tnrn/Three-Cities-Within-Toronto-2010-Final.pdf>.
- Hyde, Z. 2018. Giving back to get ahead: Altruism as a developer strategy of accumulation through affordable housing policy in Toronto and Vancouver. *Geoforum*. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0016718518302094>.
- Jones, C. E. 2020. Transit-oriented development and suburban gentrification: A “Natural Reality” of refugee displacement in Metro Vancouver. *Housing Policy Debate*: 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2020.1839935>.
- . 2022. Does a mayor matter? Gentrification, land use policy, and the 2018 mayoral election in Burnaby, BC. *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe canadien* 66(1): 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cag.12759>.
- Jones, C. E. and C. Ley. 2016. Transit-oriented development and gentrification along Metro Vancouver's low-income SkyTrain corridor. *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe canadien* 60(1): 9–22.
- Keil, R. ed. 2013. Introduction. In *Suburban constellations: Governance, land and infrastructure in the 21st century*. Jovis verlag.
- Keil, R., P. Hamel, E. Chou, and K. Williams. 2015. Modalities of suburban governance in Canada. In *Suburban governance. A global view*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 80–109.
- Kemeny, J. 1986. A Critique of homeownership. In *Critical perspectives on housing*, eds. R. G. Bratt, C. W. Hartman, and A. Meyerson. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Leone, R., and B. W. Carroll. 2010. Decentralisation and devolution in Canadian social housing policy. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 28(3): 389–404.
- Ley, D., and N. Lynch. 2020. The social geography of uneven incomes in Metropolitan Vancouver. In *Changing neighbourhoods: Social and spatial polarization in Canadian cities*, eds. J. Grant, A. Walks, and H. Ramos. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 126–147.
- Li, W. 2006. *From urban enclave to ethnic suburb: New Asian communities in Pacific Rim countries*. University of Hawaii Press.
- Lorimer, J. 1978. *The developers*. James Lorimer. Toronto, ON.
- Markley, S. 2018. Suburban gentrification? Examining the geographies of new urbanism in Atlanta's inner suburbs. *Urban Geography* 39(4): 606–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2017.1381534>.
- Mensah, J., and D. Tucker-Simmons. 2021. Social (in) justice and rental housing discrimination in urban Canada: The case of ethno-racial minorities in the Herongate community in Ottawa. *Studies in Social Justice* 15(1): 81–101.
- Moos, M., A. Kramer, M. Williamson, P. Mendez, L. McGuire, E. Wyly, and R. Walter-Joseph. 2015. More continuity than change? Re-evaluating the contemporary socio-economic and housing characteristics of suburbs. *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 24(2): 64–90.
- Nijman, J., and T. Clery. 2015. The United States: Suburban imaginaries and metropolitan realities. In *Suburban*

- governance: A global view*, eds. P. Hamel and R. Keil. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 57–79.
- Paradis, E., R. M. Wilson, and J. Logan. 2014. *Nowhere else to go: Inadequate housing and risk of homelessness among families in Toronto's aging rental buildings*. Research Paper 231. Cities Centre. Univ. of Toronto. <http://neighbourhoodchange.ca/documents/2014/04/paradis-et-al-2014-nowhere-else-to-go-inadequate-housing-risk-of-homelessness-among-families-intorontos-aging-rental-buildings-rp231.pdf>.
- Pomeroy, S. 1995. A Canadian perspective on housing policy. *Housing Policy Debate* 6(3): 619–653.
- . 2001. *Toward a comprehensive affordable housing strategy for Canada*. Ottawa, ON: Caledon Institute of Social Policy. <https://www.focus-consult.com/ResearchFiles/By%20Year/2003/Toward%20an%20Affordable%20Housing%20Strategy%20Caledon%20Inst%202003.pdf>.
- . 2004a. *Leaks in the roof, cracks in the floor: Identifying gaps in Canada's housing system*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Housing and Renewal Association. <https://www.focus-consult.com/ResearchFiles/By%20Year/2004/Leaks%20in%20the%20Roof%20Cracks%20in%20the%20Floor%20CHRA%202004%20National%20Symposium%20.pdf>.
- . 2004b. *Toward a comprehensive affordable housing strategy for Canada*. In *Finding room: Policy options for a Canadian rental housing strategy*, eds. D. Hulchanski, and M. Shapcott. Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto.
- . 2012. *The housing market and Canada's economic recovery*. Federation of Canadian Municipalities/ Fédération canadienne des municipalités. https://data.fcm.ca/documents/reports/The_Housing_Market_and_Canadas_Economic_Recovery_EN.pdf.
- . 2015. *Built to last: Strengthening the foundations of housing in Canada*. Federation of Canadian Municipalities. https://data.fcm.ca/documents/reports/FCM/Built_to_Last_Strengthening_the_foundations_of_housing_in_Canada_EN.pdf.
- . 2020. *Why Canada needs a non-market rental acquisition strategy*. May 2020. Focus Consulting Inc. <https://www.focus-consult.com/why-canada-needs-a-non-market-rental-acquisition-strategy/>.
- Pomeroy, S., and D. Maclennan. 2019. *Rental housing in Canada's cities: Challenges and responses*. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities and Maytree. <https://maytree.com/wp-content/uploads/201904-UP2-RentalHousing-ChallengesResponses.pdf>.
- Prince, M. 1998. Holes in the safety net, leaks in the roof: Changes in Canadian welfare policy and their implications for social housing programs. *Housing Policy Debate* 9(4): 825–848.
- Rosen, G., and A. Walks. 2015. Castles in Toronto's sky: Condoism as urban transformation. *Journal of Urban Affairs* 85(1): 39–66.
- Shapcott, M. 2004. Where are we going? Recent federal and provincial housing policy. In *Finding room: Policy options for a Canadian rental housing strategy*, eds. D. Hulchanski and M. Shapcott. Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto.
- Statistics Canada, 1991 Census of Population, Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 95F0168X.
- Suttor, G. 2016. *Still renovating: A history of Canadian social housing policy*. Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.
- Teixeira, C. 2014. Living on the “edge of the suburbs” of Vancouver: A case study of the housing experiences and coping strategies of recent immigrants in Surrey and Richmond. *The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe canadien* 58(2): 168–187.
- Tilly, C. 2006. The economic environment of housing: Income inequality and insecurity. In *A right to housing: Foundation for a new social agenda*, eds. R. G. Bratt, M. E. Stone and C. W. Hartman. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Vancouver, City of. 2022. *Broadway plan*. <https://guidelines.vancouver.ca/policy-plan-broadway.pdf>.
- Walks, A. 2001. The social ecology of the post-Fordist/Global City? Economic restructuring and socio-spatial polarization in the Toronto urban region. *Urban Studies* 38(3): 407–447.
- . 2020. Inequality and neighbourhood change in the Greater Toronto Region. In *Changing neighbourhoods: Social and spatial polarization in Canadian cities*, eds. J. Grant, A. Walks and H. Ramos. Vancouver BC: UBC Press, 78–99.
- Walks, A., and B. Clifford. 2015. The political economy of mortgage securitization and the neoliberalization of housing policy in Canada. *Environment and Planning A* 47(8): 1624–1642.